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Abstract 
Is separation of the political and religious realms necessary for a democracy to flourish? 
This article argues that, whereas both the Catholic Church’s social teaching and Protestant 
thinking, especially as developed in the Netherlands, recognize the relationship between religion 
and democracy, only Catholicism explicitly acknowledges that Christianity is vital for sustaining 
democracy. Compared with the Catholic Church’s social teaching, Herman Dooyeweerd’s views 
on values and democracy, for example, are relatively underdeveloped. Even after his death, 
Dooyeweerd’s thought continues to influence one of the Dutch Protestant political parties, 
insofar as it still regards democracy as an instrument for a Christian political order, rather than 
as the expression of one. 
 
Introduction 
The starting point of our article is the debate that took place in 2004 between 
philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas and theologian and churchman Joseph Ratzinger 
(elected Pope the following year) on the prepolitical moral foundations of the democratic order. 
We begin by examining the philosophical background of Ratzinger’s position in this debate, i.e., 
the Catholic Church’s social teaching. Next, largely on the basis of Jonathan Chaplin’s recent 
study Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian Philosopher of State and Society, we argue that 
Dooyeweerd’s views on values and democracy are relatively underdeveloped. 
The article then goes on to explore the implications of this for the Christian Union (CU), 
a Dutch Christian political party that continues to be influenced by Dooyeweerd, even after his 
death. From 2007 to 2010, the CU was a coalition partner in the Balkenende IV cabinet, 
together with the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats; in 2010, the CU was 
vehemently opposed to the formation of the Rutte cabinet, a minority coalition of Liberals and 
Christian Democrats, which received parliamentary support from Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam 
Freedom Party (PVV).1 Yet a 2011 letter by the then Christian Democratic Minister of the 
Interior Piet Hein Donner to the House of Representatives on integration, engagement, and 
citizenship was more outspoken with respect to values and democracy than any other policy 
document in recent decades.  
In what way then is religion or a prepolitical moral foundation defended as indispensable 
for the democratic order? It turns out that, although both Catholic and Protestant traditions 
recognize the relationship between religion and democracy, only the Catholic Church’s social 
teaching views democracy as not just an instrument for a Christian political order but as the true 
expression of it. 
 
The Habermas–Ratzinger Debate 
In January 2004, Habermas and Ratzinger met to debate the moral foundations of the 
constitutional state. According to Habermas, the democratic constitution of such a state 
provides legitimacy in and of itself, and its foundations can be considered entirely post-
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metaphysical or secular.2 Because this is very much the mainstream opinion today, there is no 
need to elaborate on it here. 
Ratzinger, by contrast, questions whether legality equals legitimacy, and believes that the 
standard of justice should be found in the moral foundations of Western political culture, 
notably the Christian faith and Western secular rationality. He agrees that, because it ensures 
the participation of citizens in policy making, among other activities, democracy can be 
considered “the most appropriate form of political order.” Nevertheless, he identifies one crucial 
problem—that as history shows, majorities can reach utterly unjust decisions. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which was published after World War II and articulated basic 
human dignities that could not (in principle) be compromised by popular vote, is valuable in this 
respect but does not suffice.3 
As noted above, the philosophical background from which Ratzinger develops this 
position is the Catholic Church’s social teaching. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church, compiled in the 1990s by an editorial committee chaired by Ratzinger, emphasizes that 
the Bible provides “endless inspiration for Christian reflection on political power, recalling that 
it comes from God and is an integral part of the order that he created.”4 
With respect to this created order, the Compendium affirms that “[t]he political 
community originates in the nature of persons, whose conscience ‘reveals to them and enjoins 
them to obey’ the order which God has imprinted in all his creatures.”5 It is the task of humanity 
to discover and develop this order. No matter how much human creativity is required for that 
purpose, however, “[t]his order ‘has no existence except in God; cut off from God it must 
necessarily disintegrate’.”6 
Like Ratzinger, the Compendium “values” democracy. It adds, however, that “an 
authentic democracy is not merely the result of a formal observation of a set of rules but is the 
fruit of a convinced acceptance of the values that inspire democratic procedures: the dignity of 
every human person, the respect of human rights, commitment to the common good as the 
purpose and guiding criterion for political life. If there is no general consensus on these values, 
the deepest meaning of democracy is lost and its stability is compromised.”7 
Nevertheless, such a consensus is exactly what is missing in modern-day democracies, 
because of ethical relativism. According to the Compendium, this constitutes a serious threat 
because “if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political action, then ideas and 
convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a 
democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.”8 
Understandably, the Compendium then goes on to warn that further marginalization of 
Christianity in, for example, the West “would not bode well for the future of society or for 
consensus among peoples; indeed, it would threaten the very spiritual and cultural foundations 
of civilization.”9 
In summary, then, the democratic order according to Ratzinger and Catholic social 
teaching is an expression of Judeo-Christian values. Therefore, a democracy that has been 
alienated from these values will sooner or later adopt totalitarian traits. Democracy is only safe 
in God—that is, in a society with God-fearing citizens. Or, as political scientist Hugh Heclo put it 
when discussing the relationship between Christianity and American democracy: “Non-believers 
 
  44
A forum for academic, social, and timely issues affecting religious communities around the world. 
www.irdialogue.org 
To submit an article visit www.irdialogue.org/submissions 
may not believe the Christians’ answers, but a democratic society is surely better off for having 
to confront the Big Questions rather than pretending they do not exist. Without a strong, 
publicly engaged Christian presence, America will become a different and not a better place.”10 
Dooyeweerd’s Position 
Let us now turn to a Protestant position in the debate. Jonathan Chaplin’s aim in his 
recent book on Dooyeweerd is to demonstrate “how his work amounts to a striking and 
characteristically Protestant philosophy of social pluralism and civil society, comparable in 
range and depth to contributions emerging from twentieth-century Catholic social thinkers such 
as Jacques Maritain and Heinrich Rommen.”11 
It is our contention, however, that “the contrast between the impressive legacy of 
Thomistic thought and the paucity of Calvinist philosophizing” by which Dooyeweerd was struck 
in 192512 still exists with respect to the pressing issues of values and democracy. 
As in Catholic social teaching, Dooyeweerd’s “creation motive” implies the notion that 
“[t]he design of the created cosmos is determined throughout by ‘divine law,’ which structures 
and sustains its existence.”13 More specifically with regard to the state, Dooyeweerd holds that 
its dominant features can be summarized as “power in service of justice.”14 According to 
Chaplin, Dooyeweerd favors “a form of constitutional democracy in which popular will is 
channeled through and limited by justice-embodying constitutional structures. For him it is 
more important to limit the state’s power and authority than to ensure that its actions reflect 
popular will.”15 
It can therefore be assumed that Dooyeweerd stands closer to Ratzinger than to 
Habermas, in the sense that both would probably agree that the democratic order is, as one 
author recently put it, “not culture-free.” Instead, this order possesses distinctive cultural 
elements that “ought to be carefully investigated, specified, and acknowledged, if liberal 
democracies are to continue existing as such.”16 
Yet, as Chaplin points out, for Dooyeweerd, “[d]emocracy, it seems, is not given on the 
law side but is only a positive form, the appropriateness of which depends on historical 
conditions rather than on conformity to a structural norm.”17 Chaplin rightly observes that this 
view can be considered “problematic,” if only because the “troubling implication” is that not 
even the question of whether the state should be organized internally in an autocratic or a 
democratic manner can be decided by referring to the state’s structural principles.18 
Chaplin believes it is possible to argue that the idea of the state as a public–legal 
community somehow implies political participation of its citizens. It is telling, however, that 
Dooyeweerd himself did not draw this conclusion and—as Chaplin admits—would possibly have 
resisted it. In addition, according to Chaplin, “[t]he passages in NC  where Dooyeweerd 
discusses the concept of the nation are among the denser and more obscure in his account of the 
state.”19 All in all, Dooyeweerd’s views on values and democracy seem less sophisticated and, as 
a result, less conclusive than those of Catholic social teaching, to say the least. 
 
CU and Democracy 
Dooyeweerd’s weakly developed ideas on parliamentary democracy are still reflected in 
Dutch politics. The CU stands in the neo-Calvinist or antirevolutionary political tradition as 
 
  45
A forum for academic, social, and timely issues affecting religious communities around the world. 
www.irdialogue.org 
To submit an article visit www.irdialogue.org/submissions 
developed by the Dutch politician and theologian Abraham Kuyper in the late nineteenth 
century. The political branch of neo-Calvinism was called antirevolutionary. Its antagony has to 
be understood as follows: it is opposed to the ideas of the French Revolution, especially the 
modeling of society according to the uniform rule of reason, and evacuating religion from the 
public sphere and banishing it to the private one. The antirevolutionaries defended a plural 
society, for example by promoting equal legal rights and public funding for religious and non-
religious based schools.20 Dooyeweerd belonged to this tradition and was active in the 1920s as 
President of the Scientific Institute of Kuyper’s Anti-Revolutionary Party. His work strengthened 
the theoretical basis of the antirevolutionary tradition and, after World War II, his philosophical 
work spurred the tradition’s renewal when the key notions of authority and limitation of state 
power were exchanged for those such as responsibility and social justice.21 The CU was founded 
in 2000, as a merger of two Christian political parties that had represented the antirevolutionary 
tradition in Dutch politics during the last quarter of the twentieth century.22 The CU may be 
regarded as the political expression of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical school, and CU 
representatives in the Dutch Parliament, such as former party leader André Rouvoet and 
(former) senators Egbert Schuurman and Roel Kuiper, have been trained in this philosophical 
tradition. Schuurman and Kuiper are professors in Christian philosophy, as the Dooyeweerd 
school is called today. 
The starting point for Christian philosophy—and for the CU’s reflection on and 
appreciation of democracy—is that this world, including the state and politics, are subject to God 
as creator and redeemer. From this perspective, the CU diagnoses secularized Western culture, 
including democracy, as having abandoned the guiding principles of Christianity. However, 
despite its negative evaluation of the Western world, the CU is not abandoning this culture. This 
is still God’s world, and Christians must serve culture and society with the Good News, in private 
and in public. This is in full accordance with the antirevolutionary tradition and its notions of 
the antithesis between the Christian faith and others and a common (nonsaving) grace for all, as 
proposed by Kuyper. Thus, the CU stands on two legs: passive acceptance of secular democracy 
and active striving for democracy with a Christian character.23 
Given its religious premise and its sensitivity to antireligious trends in modern culture, 
the CU is receptive to a critique of Western culture not so much from an economic or political 
point of view, but from a moral point of view of view, whether from existentialist, neo-Marxist, 
or environmentalist ideologies. At present, Islam in particular is in vogue. The basis of the 
Islamic critique of Western culture is its alienation from Allah. The CU rejects any radical 
Islamic criticism of Western culture that includes use of violence, but appreciates reformist 
Islamic criticism—rejecting trends in modern culture, but not modern culture as such. In 2007, 
CU senator Egbert Schuurman proposed a “moral pact” between Islam and Christianity as a 
cultural counterforce against Enlightenment ideas and practices. He referred to Islamic 
philosophers like Mohammed Iqbad and Mohammad Abdus Salam who want to embed 
technology in such a way as to guarantee justice, equality, solidarity, harmony, and 
environmental care.24 
Schuurman did not discuss the political aspects of a pact with Islam. However, one 
problem with Islam in Western societies is their relative unfamiliarity with Islam. The 
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incapability to cope with a different religion is the main reason why politicians in France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom declared in 2011 ‘multiculturalism’ a complete failure.25 
According to these politicians, Muslim immigrants should not be met with multicultural 
tolerance but with secular strength. The example of the Netherlands—where two anti-islamists, 
politician Pim Fortuyn and artist Theo van Gogh, were murdered—is often used to illustrate this 
problem.26 In the context of this development towards secularism it is our contention that the 
liberal democratic system requires a reevaluation by religiously based political parties. How 
does Christianity relate to democracy? Religions may agree on the ontological existence of a 
prepolitical moral order, but epistemologically the antirevolutionary tradition “expects abiding 
disagreement about the content” of this order.27 According to Catholic social teaching, the moral 
order implies democracy. In this sense, democracy is inextricably linked with Christianity or, 
even more specifically, with Calvinism (democracy was not accepted by the Catholic Church 
until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s).28 As Heclo pointed out, Christianity is not the 
whole story of American democracy, and Christianity has had a dynamic rather than static 
relationship with democracy, but “the Christian affirmations of human equality, individuation, 
and ordinary life have been critically important grounding influences for thinking about 
democratic man.” It was Christianity, and not religion in general, that promoted American 
democracy.29 
The relationship between democracy and Islam is a matter of standing debate, at least in 
Europe. Schuurman’s pact therefore has the potential to cause problems when democracy is at 
stake, and, in line with Chaplin’s evaluation of Dooyeweerd’s thought, reveals a weakly 
developed Christian concept of democracy. 
Democracy is indeed at stake: Islam challenges Western democracies to speak out on 
their character. Will Western democracies allow indigenous religions—Christianity and 
Judaism—only in the public doman, will they include Islam as well, or do they ban all religions 
from the public domain? What is the CU’s position on this issue? Traditionally, the CU focused 
on freedom of conscience as the litmus test for democracy. Democracy was essentially an 
instrument, a means to safeguard liberties for Christians and others. The CU takes religion as its 
criterion against which to evaluate political trends. Hence the CU’s negative judgment of the so-
called purple coalitions of Liberals and Social Democrats (1994–2002)—these coalitions 
rejected an ethical approach to political issues, and therefore Dutch society quickly lost its 
Christian benchmark. Schuurman therefore proposed the pact with Islam: the West is 
threatened primarily not by antidemocratic ideologies, but by antireligious forces. 
Nevertheless, the CU’s position is strengthening. In its 2010 and 2012 manifestos, the 
party placed more emphasis on the acceptance of democracy as essential for participation in 
Dutch society. It bases this stance on religious grounds, stating that constitutional democracy 
was developed within a Christian context. This last move is part of a longer development in 
Christian politics from an exclusive position—society must obey God’s commandments—toward 
an inclusive one: society must treat all opinions equally, especially those of religious minorities. 
The CU still resists any restriction on religious freedom, but has accepted a more inclusive 
definition of democracy. However, the party still lacks a positive, intrinsic definition of 
democracy as the political expression of Christianity. 
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In 2007, the CU, Christian Democrats, and Social Democrats formed a coalition 
government that remained in office until 2010. During this period, democracy was challenged by 
Islamic critics and populist parties such as the PVV. In reaction, this coalition—sometimes 
called the “Dooyeweerd cabinet” because then prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende and some 
other Christian Democratic ministers, like their CU colleagues,30 were pupils of the Dooyeweerd 
school—stated that democracy should be driven by values. Perhaps this phrase reflected the 
CU’s conviction that government and society must obey God’s commandments, but the values 
by which democracy was to be driven were not explicated. In this political context, Schuurman’s 
pact with Islam sent out somewhat confusing signals. The pact reflected the classic notion of the 
CU that religion is fundamental to modern society, while simultaneously forming a coalition 
with a secular party and defending an inclusive position that did not explicitly state a 
relationship between Christianity and democracy. With whom would the CU ultimately side: 
with the religion-driven or the democracy-driven factions? 
No answer was given, but the CU’s vehement opposition to the coalition formed in 2010 
was based on the government’s apparent allowance of religious discrimination. PVV’s 
qualification of Islam as ‘ideology’ was not rejected initially by this coalition as an insult but 
neutralized as a ‘point of view.’ In reaction, the CU asked for reaffirming the core values of the 
Dutch constitutional state.31 The CU was clearly motivated by religion on this occasion. 
Interestingly, this coalition has been clearer on the values-driven character of democracy than 
any other coalition in recent decades. Both coalition parties explicitly defended freedom for all 
religions and labeled Islam a religion, thus distancing themselves from the PVV. While 
defending religious freedom on the one hand, on the other hand they rejected the notion of a 
multicultural society without a Leitkultur that was popular in the Netherlands in the 1990s. 
There was something like a typical Dutch culture  and the coalition stressed that Dutch society is 
not exchangeable for any other. 
For the first time in decades, a cabinet dared to postulate a direct relationship between 
democracy and, specifically, Dutch historical or cultural features, such as language, monuments, 
architectural styles, or unwritten codes of conduct and behavior. The first Rutte cabinet (2010-
2012) has admitted to prepolitical foundations of the democratic order or, in its own words, “a 
fundamental continuity of values, opinions, institutions and habits that define and mark the 
leading culture of Dutch society.”32 
Although one may appreciate this vision of democracy and values, it is clear that the 
coalition did exactly what may have been expected from the CU—it rejected an inclusive 
definition of democracy, instead relating it to specific values. Christianity is not mentioned 
explicitly among these values, but it is clear that the historical and cultural values, as expressed 
in, for example, the country’s monuments and architectural styles monuments and architectural 
styles, are mainly those of this religion. This is more than the CU achieved in the preceding 
coalition or in its own political manifestos. 
The antirevolutionary tradition has traditionally been characterized by a rather 
instrumental view of democracy, one that has never been linked directly to Christianity.33 The 
rise of Islam and anti-Islamic sentiments in Dutch society led CU senator Schuurman to invite 
Islamic representatives into a moral coalition against secularism. Paradoxically, parties with a 
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less marked Christian profile than the CU had a different reaction to these sentiments. Thus, the 
Liberal–Christian Democratic cabinet stressed the moral foundations of Dutch democracy. In 
the absence of any metaphysical reference, the cabinet’s position may be characterized as 
Habermassian in the sense used above. However, the explicit reference to cultural expressions 
such as architecture and monuments was, without doubt, a hidden reference to Christianity. 
 
Conclusion 
Ratzinger’s argument that democracy cannot do without Christianity is rooted in a broad 
tradition of Catholic social teaching on democracy and the common good, especially since the 
Second Vatican Council. In contrast, Protestant reflections on democracy are scarce in the Dutch 
case, and Dooyeweerd—or the tradition of Christian philosophy he founded—hardly addressed 
this burning issue. This paucity is reflected in the CU’s view of democracy. The party admits that 
values, in the form of religion, are needed to sustain democracy, but it lacks a sophisticated view 
of democracy. Now that democracy is at stake, the CU is alarmed by voices that want to exclude 
a religion such as Islam, but it is ignoring the underlying problem, which is the absence of a 
standard definition of Dutch democracy. It is therefore clear that, although both Catholic and 
Dutch Protestant traditions recognize the relationship between religion and democracy, only 
Catholic social teaching views democracy as not just an instrument for a Christian political order 
but as the true expression of it. 
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